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egulations restricting market entry are among
those that have a very direct impact on compe-
tition. In the Philippine banking sector, such regu-
latory restrictions have had adverse effects on the sector's
structure, conduct and performance while the liberalization
of these restrictions have led to a more competitive bank-
ing sector.
This Policy Notes provides a brief review of the impact
of regulatory restrictions on entry and branching on the com-
mercial banking sector in the Philippines and argues that
deregulation of such policies is a key element in fostering a
more competitive atmosphere.
Regulation of bank entry and branching
in the Philippines: a review
Philippine government policy on domestic bank entry
was initially lax in the 1950s and early 1960s, as the Cen-
tral Bank of the Philippines (CBP) actively promoted the de-
velopment of the banking system to finance the reconstruc-
tion of the economy after the war. It became very restrictive,
however, beginning in the mid-1960s as the rapid expan-
sion of the banking system led to increased instability. By
that time, the CBP became increasingly concerned over the
large number of small banks. It then decided to raise mini-
mum capital requirements and essentially prohibited new
bank entry. It also imposed tighter restrictions on bank
branching, especially in areas identified as heavily or over-
branched. Meanwhile, the moratorium on the entry of new
foreign banks had been imposed since the time the CBP
began operations in 1949 for nationalistic reasons. These
entry and branching restrictions remained throughout the
1970s and 1980s. Minimum capital requirements were also
consecutively raised during these periods. Thus, it was
pointed out that the Philippines’ financial liberalization pro-
gram in the early 1980s did not enhance competition be-
cause interest rate liberalization was not accompanied by
the complementary measure of deregulation of entry restric-
tions (Tan 1989).
It was only in 1992 that restrictions on new domestic
bank entry and branching began to be effectively relaxed. In
1995, they were further simplified and made uniform across2 December 2001
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banks. Geographical restrictions on domestic bank branch-
ing were lifted in 1993, enabling branches to be established
anywhere subject to certain prudential requirements. The
moratorium on foreign banks was lifted in May 1994 with
the passing of RA 7721 which partially liberalized the entry
and scope of operations of foreign banks albeit retaining
tight branching restrictions. In the aftermath of the 1997
Asian crisis, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) once
again imposed a moratorium on the establishment of new
banks and the branch expansion of existing banks, except
for microfinance-oriented banks. It also mandated consecu-
tive increases in banks’ minimum capital requirements. The
new General Banking Law of 2000 (RA 8791) formalized a
three-year moratorium on new bank entry even as it allowed
foreign banks to acquire up to 100 percent of the voting
stock of (only) one domestic bank for a period of seven
years from the effectivity of the law.
On the whole, government barriers to bank entry, e.g.,
direct entry restrictions and higher capitalization require-
ments, were imposed primarily to limit and reduce the num-
ber of banks as well as to increase their average size. Big-
ger and fewer banks were seen to promote the safety and
soundness of the country's financial system. However, as
shown in the next section, barriers to entry also had an
adverse impact on the banking sector’s structure, con-
duct and performance.
Structure, conduct and performance:
some indicators
Banking structure. In general, one will note that
there has been no significant structural change in
the Philippine financial sector in the last 30 years.
Banks, particularly commercial banks, have consis-
tently dominated the Philippine financial system. In
fact, the importance of commercial banks even in-
creased over time, with the asset share of commer-
cial banks increasing from around 57 percent in 1970
to 73 percent in 1999. In contrast, the asset share
of rural banks fell from around 3 percent in the 1970s
to less than 2 percent in 1999 and that of thrift banks
slightly rose from 4 percent in 1970 to 6 percent in
1999.
The number of banking offices operating in the Philip-
pines have particularly grown in the 1990s when restric-
tions, especially on bank branching, were eased as gleaned
from Table 1. Compared to just 0.5 percent in the 1980s,
the number grew by 8.7 percent in the 1990s, with all bank
categories posting significant growth. Furthermore, the rapid
growth took place across all regions. Thus, it shows that
deregulation of branching, in particular, had a significant
impact on regional access to basic banking services in terms
of deposits and loans.
The period after 1995 was also characterized by sig-
nificant movement in the commercial banking sector in terms
of new entries and consolidations as seen in Table 2. In
particular, the number of foreign bank branches and subsid-
iaries increased as a result of the partial deregulation of
entry. The number of domestic private banks initially in-
creased in the first half of the 1990s as a result of deregu-
lation of entry, then decreased in the latter half due to merg-
ers and acquisitions. Although the BSP especially encour-
aged mergers and acquisitions among the small banks to
meet the higher capital requirements, the mergers and ac-
quisitions primarily took place among the biggest banks.
Thus, the Philippine banking system continued to be
characterized by the presence of a few large commercial
1980 1985 1990 1995 Jun '99
Banking Institutions 3,419 3,632 3,638 5,569 7,689
Head offices 1,209 1,055 940 938 976
Branches/Agencies 2,210 2,577 2,698 4,631 6,713
A. Commercial banks 1,501 1,744 1,813 3,047 4,326
Head offices 32 30 30 46 52
Branches/Agencies 1,469 1,714 1,783 3,001 4,274
B. Thrift banks 671 671 653 925 1,478
Head offices 144 118 103 99 118
Branches/Agencies 527 553 550 826 1,360
C. Rural banks 1,155 1,117 1,045 1,346 1,885
Head offices 1,030 904 804 790 806
Branches/Agencies 125 213 241 556 1,079
Source of basic data: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Table 1. Number of banking institutions, 1980-993 No. 2001-16
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banks and a lot of very small thrift and rural banks.
Tan (1989) had argued that the ultimate effect of the
policy of restricted entry into the banking sector had
been to shield both the big and small banks from com-
petition. This allowed the big banks to earn abnormal
profits and the small banks to operate at high costs.
Measures of concentration. In terms of the dis-
tribution of commercial bank assets according to own-
ership of banks, Figure 1 shows that private domestic
banks consistently accounted for over 60 percent of
total commercial bank assets. Private domestic banks’
share rose to as high as 77 percent in 1994,
before subsequently falling to around 67 per-
cent in 1999, with the entry of the ten foreign
banks in 1995. If the share of the Philippine
National Bank (PNB), which passed into major-
ity private ownership in 1995, is included, the
share rises to around 76 percent in 1999. On
the other hand, the asset share of foreign bank
branches and subsidiaries rose from around 9
percent in 1995 to 17.5 percent in 1997, which
indicates a decreasing dominance of the do-
mestic commercial banks. As to the share of
government-owned commercial banks, it de-
clined from less than 27 percent in 1980 (ac-
counted for by PNB) to 12.6 percent in 1999.
Figure 2 presents some measures of as-
set concentration in the Philippine commercial
banking system. Although the actual value of the Herfindahl
index (HI)1 may not be indicative of undue concentration
given its very low values, it would also be useful to look at
the trend. The HI was fairly stable from 1990-94. It began to
decline beginning in 1995 with the entry of the new foreign
banks, indicating that the system was becoming less con-
centrated. However, this trend was reversed beginning in
1998, which means that the mergers and acquisitions also
resulted in increasing concentration.
Similar trends are also evident when one looks at the
asset share of the three and five largest commercial banks,
all of which are domestic banks. Before the restriction on
new foreign bank entry was eased in 1995, the five largest
commercial banks consistently accounted for around half
of the sector’s total assets. Their share declined to around
37 percent in 1997. This trend, however, has since been
reversed. Moreover, the gap between the five biggest and
five smallest commercial banks is starklingly wide.
The continued dominance of a few, large commercial
banks raises the issue of market power. Thus, there is a
need to monitor the concentration process even in a de-
regulated environment to detect any further strengthening
of the oligopolistic group in the commercial banking sector
and to ensure that it does not lead to misuse of market
power.
__________
1The Herfindahl index, which is a commonly used measure of in-
dustrial concentration, is calculated by squaring and summing the share
of industry size accounted for by every firm in the industry, with a maxi-
mum value of 1 (or 10,000 where the market share is measured in per-
centage terms) indicating a monopoly.
Type of bank 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 20001
Total 32 30 30 46 52 47
Private domestic banks 27 25 25 30 30 25
Foreign bank branches 4 4 4 14 13 13
Foreign bank subsidiaries 6 6
Government banks 1 1 1 2 3 3
1Data for 2000 are only for the first quarter and incorporated the
approved mergers and acquisitions.
Source of basic data: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.














1/Includes branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks.
Source of basic data: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
Figure 1. Distribution of commercial bank assets by type
of bank, 1980-2000Q1 (in percent)4 December 2001
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Operational efficiency. Operational efficiency is a
microeconomic concept. It is, however, also used to charac-
terize a financial system. In particular, the market structure
could be reflected in the spread between the cost of funds
and the lending rate: a financial system is considered op-
erationally efficient if the interest spread is low. The latter
arises from two factors. One, on a microeconomic level, the
more cost efficient banks are, the lower the spread will be
under reasonably competitive conditions. And two, on a mac-
roeconomic level, systemic risks also affect the spread. A
more stable and confident environment will lead to a lower
risk premium over lending, thus leading to a lower spread.
A high intermediation margin would imply a smaller
intermediation activity. One of the structural weaknesses
identified in the Philippine banking sector in the past was
the large spread between commercial bank deposit and lend-
ing rates. This was attributed to high intermediation costs
mainly in the form of taxes and reserve requirements as
well as high profit margins. Tan (1989) also pointed out that
the interest rate differential might not just be due to taxes
but to some monopoly power of the large commercial banks
as well. More recently, the World Bank (1998) noted that
high intermediation costs continued to be a feature of the
Philippine banking system in 1988-95, espe-
cially when compared to other Asian econo-
mies.2 In addition to high reserve requirements
and the mandated credit requirements, it at-
tributed the Philippines’ continued high inter-
mediation costs to high operating costs and in-
sufficient competition. In particular, it noted that
the “high profits despite high costs indicate lack
of competition, which is also evidenced by the
fact that there is high concentration in the bank-
ing sector…” (World Bank 1998: p. 23).
The partial liberalization of foreign bank
entry in 1994 precisely aimed to increase com-
petition and improve efficiency in the domestic
banking sector. Nevertheless, although it led
to some changes in the banking structure, particularly the
decline in concentration ratios, there has been no signifi-
cant impact on bank spreads. Table 3 shows domestic com-
mercial banks’ average spread and rates of return both prior
to and after the easing of the restriction on foreign bank
entry took place. Both only slightly declined during the post-
liberalization years prior to the Asian crisis.
Recent studies have examined the impact of the en-
try of more foreign banks on domestic banks’ interest rate
spreads and efficiency (e.g., Manzano and Neri 2001,
Montinola and Moreno 2001, Unite and Sullivan 2001).
Overall, their results indicate that foreign bank entry has
had limited impact. Manzano and Neri noted that the ef-
fects on competition might not have been felt immediately
because of a period of adjustment for the foreign banks
and/or because liberalization did not go far enough. Ulti-
mately, though, they attributed the persistence of high bank
spreads to the government’s macroeconomic policy mix
which could have masked the impact of foreign bank entry
on the domestic banks’ interest spread. According to
Montinola and Moreno, meanwhile, the scope of liberaliza-
tion was limited, hence, its modest effects on competitive-
ness and efficiency.
While the entry of more foreign banks in 1995 has
not had a visible impact in terms of reducing domestic banks’
interest spread, this does not mean that foreign banks have
had no impact whatsoever on domestic banks’ operations
and the level of competition in the banking sector. Focusing
__________
2The interest spread is often used for international comparisons of
financial sector efficiency. But as Claessens and Glaessner (1998) noted,
cross-country comparisons should be done with care because a number of
country-specific regulatory, tax, macroeconomic and microeconomic fac-





































































































Source of basic data: Published balance sheet statements of commercial banks.
Figure 2. Measures of commercial bank asset
concentration, 1990-2000Q15 No. 2001-16
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on price or interest competition does not take into account
the dynamic aspect of competition and efficiency. The latter
refers to the structural response of banks to deregulation
as reflected, for instance, in their balance sheets or changes
in the structure of their assets and liabilities.
In contrast to traditional static models’ focus on price
competition in analyzing industrial organization, more recent
dynamic models argue that firms in reality are “engaged in
a continuing dynamic competitive process, constantly creat-
ing and adopting new products and processes in order to
gain advantage over their rivals” (Audretsch et al. 2001:
p. 618). And in a dynamic economy, the latter may have a
more significant effect on welfare than the former in the
long run. The issue is especially relevant to financial mar-
kets as they operate in more deregulated and globalized
environments and become increasingly characterized by tech-
nological advancements and product innovations.
In the Philippines, foreign banks traditionally competed
with local banks primarily in corporate lending and nonbranch-
based financial services. A survey of selected local banks
on their reactions to the entry of more foreign banks in
1995 indicated that the latter has led to a more competitive
environment particularly in wholesale banking (Hapitan
2001). The entry of more foreign banks further reduced the
already thinning spreads from servicing corporate accounts
because of the entry of more local banks in the early 1990s.
This induced local banks to tap other segments of the mar-
ket that would generate higher returns. Thus, local banks
shifted their focus towards developing products and ser-
vices for the middle and retail consumer markets, and to
some extent the previously neglected small and medium-
sized enterprises. Local banks also sought to improve exist-
ing product lines and services, especially by introducing tech-
nology-based enhancements such as phone banking, bills
payment, point of sale transactions, and internet banking
(AAC 1998). But as Hapitan (2001) also noted, re-engineer-
ing was undertaken by the domestic banks as a strategy in
itself and not because of the entry of more foreign banks
per se.
Local banks’ greater focus on retail operations could
also account for the persistence of high bank spreads, both
from the cost and profit aspects. Banks whose services are
directed more toward retail operations normally have higher
operating costs compared to banks that are more oriented
toward wholesale markets. This is due to the former’s need
for more branches, equipment and personnel to serve retail
customers. Higher operating costs could then translate into
a higher spread. The rapid expansion of branches of do-
mestic commercial banks, especially in 1995-97, accounted
for the increasing trend in their operating costs during that
period.
The shift towards the more profitable retail lending
could have also allowed banks to maintain their profit mar-
gins. The general declining trend from 1997 was due to the
overall deterioration in economic and banking conditions as
a result of the Asian crisis. The New General Banking Law
has allowed foreign banks to fully own an existing local bank,
thus relaxing the restriction on branching by foreign banks.
In December 2000, for instance, Hong Kong Shanghai Bank-
ing Corporation (HSBC) acquired a local thrift bank, which
could further enhance competition in the middle
and retail consumer markets.
Some policy implications
] Government barriers to bank en-
try are being imposed primarily to limit and re-
duce the number of banks as well as increase
their average size. Initially, the earlier restric-
tions were meant to address a situation where
there was a weak structural base in the finan-
cial system consisting of too many weak small
banks and a few strong, big banks. However,
the focus should not just be the size of banks
Average Spread1 Average Rate of Return
on Assets on Equity
Pre-liberalization: 1991-942 4.733 2.51 25.66
Post-liberalization: 1995-97 4.345 2.23 18.83
1Difference between lending and deposit rates adjusted for the gross receipts tax
and changes in required reserves.
21987-94 for Average rate of return.
Source: Lamberte (1999).
Table 3. Commercial banks’ average spread and rates
of return (in percent)6 December 2001
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but also their soundness, competitiveness and efficiency.
Since entry barriers have clearly had a negative effect as
shown in the previous sections, a policy on this aspect needs
to be firmed up.
A balance needs to be struck between the potential
costs and potential benefits of allowing greater competi-
tion. In particular, the potential adverse effects of enhanc-
ing competition through a lowering of barriers to entry can
be addressed by properly applying prudential restrictions
already in place, particularly the fitness and properness cri-
teria for bank owners and managers.
] The continuing easing of entry of foreign banks
may be helpful not only in rendering national banking mar-
kets more competitive and thereby more efficient but also
in widening and eventually changing the nature of owner-
ship of banks in the Philippines. Concentration of owner-
ship of Philippine banks continues to be a concern essen-
tially because of its adverse implications on allocation of
credit, the worst case being DOSRI (directors, officers or
stockholders and their related interests) abuses. A poten-
tial positive impact of greater foreign participation in the
Philippine banking sector is therefore on the ownership struc-
ture and orientation of domestic banks.
] Finally, in addition to the policy on entry and branch-
ing, there are other key policy issues with respect to compe-
tition in the commercial banking sector that need to be ex-
amined further.3 These include other unjustified regulatory
restrictions on competition such as mandatory credit require-
ments; the effective treatment of the “exit problem”; com-
petitive neutrality; mergers and acquisitions; and potential
anti-competitive agreements as banks enter into more co-
operative arrangements such as the interconnection of net-
works like ATMs, operation of international credit card sys-
tems and national debit transfer systems.  4 4
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